Erscheinungsdatum: 08/2010, Medium: Taschenbuch, Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert, Titel: Weakness of Nuclear Deterrence in the Near East:, Titelzusatz: Israel and Nuclear Weapons, Autor: Nashif, Taysir, Verlag: LAP Lambert Acad. Publ., Sprache: Englisch, Rubrik: Politikwissenschaft, Seiten: 116, Informationen: Paperback, Gewicht: 189 gr, Verkäufer: averdo
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This study, which focuses on the nuclear- weapons issue in the Near Eastern context, highlights the strategic, military and political nature of Israel s nuclear-weapons project. Its position on acquisition of nuclear weapons, though ambiguous in its initial stages in the later part of the 1950s and the 1960s, became increasingly less ambiguous. Strategic, military and political reasons were behind the change in such a position which, in the course of time, developed into a policy. After providing a short account of the views of a few Israeli politicians and analysts on Israel s development of nuclear weapons, discussion is conducted of the internal, regional and international factors for the weakness of nuclear deterrence in the Near East, where is currently the only state in possession of such weapons. The study concludes that a denuclearized Middle East and a just political settlement of the Palestinian-Arab- Israeli conflict would guarantee peace, security and hope for the peoples of this conflict-torn region.
High Quality Content by WIKIPEDIA articles! The Samson Option is a term used to describe Israel?s alleged deterrence strategy of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons as a ?last resort? against nations whose military attacks threaten its existence, and possibly against other targets as well. Israel refuses to admit it has nuclear weapons or to describe how it would use them, an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, also known as "nuclear opacity." This has made it difficult for anyone outside the Israeli government to definitively describe its true nuclear policy, while still allowing Israel to influence the perceptions, strategies and actions of other governments. As early as 1976, the CIA believed that Israel possessed 10 to 20 nuclear weapons. By 2002 it was estimated that the number had increased to between 75 and 200 thermonuclear weapons, each in the multiple-megaton range.
Following Israel's War of Independence in 1948-49, the anticipated peace did not materialize and the new nation soon found itself embroiled in protracted military conflict with neighboring Arab states. Demobilization of its armed forces led to the formation of special elite unit under the command of Ariel Sharon to cope with cross-border infiltration, pillage and murder. A policy of deterrence was governed by the tactic of retaliation, which contained the seeds of escalation. At the same time, a military dynamic unfolded in which the logic of field unit response dictated both military and political policy and caught the imagination of a demoralized and war-weary Israeli society. This book methodically examines the train of retaliatory actions conducted by the Israel Defense Forces, the clashing orientations among Israeli political leadership towards the deteriorating military situation, the impact of massive immigration upon the social military fabric, and the restructuring of the Israeli army within the conceptual confines of field unit reprisal actions. A connected narrative of these actions provides case study illumination of the theoretical premises of study, namely the determination of security policy from below and the interaction between agency and structure in a military setting. The myth of the Israeli paratroopers at the beginning of the 1950s, and their heroic deeds in the reprisal raids, embodied the new Zionist ethos for which the current Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, claims much of the credit. The book thus provides historical insight into some of the most intractable developments of the current Arab-Israel conflict.
Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the tradition of non-use, a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear statesâ&#8364;&#8221;thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user. The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.
'Challenge to Deterrence' is based on a panel discussion from the 1985 American Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects. Along with discussions on technology currently available to the U.S. and how it can be used more effectively, contributors speculate on Soviet strategic planning and how the U.S. can get allies, such as Japan and Israel, more involved in deterrence activity.